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Education Savings Accounts are a new form of private school choice and are arguably the 
most strongly promoted approach by voucher advocates. This policy brief examines the 
emerging policy, considering how it mirrors and differs from conventional voucher ap-
proaches and examining the legal issues that it raises.
Education Savings Accounts (ESAs) were first adopted in Arizona in 2011. The policy was 
designed to, among other things, work around state constitutional prohibitions prevent-
ing using public money to fund private schools, particularly religious schools. Parents are 
provided a set sum, often in the form of a debit account, which they can use for a variety of 
educational services including private school tuition and fees, online courses, extracurricu-
lar activities and private tutoring. Students enrolled in an ESA program are not allowed to 
concurrently attend a public school. 
During the 2017 legislative session, 13 states introduced ESA bills, although only one bill 
ultimately became law (in North Carolina). Through December 2017, however, ESA laws 
had been enacted in six states (Arizona, Florida, Tennessee, Mississippi, Nevada and North 
Carolina).
The constitutionality of ESAs has been challenged in three state courts: Arizona, Florida, 
and Nevada. The challenge to Arizona’s bill was unsuccessful; it was found to be constitu-
tional. The challenge in Florida was dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked legal standing. 
The court never considered the merits of the constitutional arguments. The Nevada lawsuit 
was successful, but the plaintiffs lost on the key constitutional argument of whether using 
taxpayer money for private education was constitutional. Instead, the plaintiffs won because 
money designated for public education could not be used to fund the ESA program.
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ESA programs use one of two approaches. The targeted approach limits eligibility to a spe-
cific group of students, most often those with disabilities (Arizona, Florida, Tennessee, Mis-
sissippi, and North Carolina). The universal model allows all school-aged students to enroll 
(Nevada). States that began with a targeted model have seen efforts to expand eligibility cri-
teria through either incremental or radical legislative expansion. In 2017, Arizona did in fact 
expand its ESA program, to make every Arizona student eligible by 2020, but a referendum 
to reverse this decision appears headed for the November 2018 ballot.
Major concerns raised about ESA programs include their lack of accountability, their po-
tential effects on social and economic stratification in schools and society, and their fiscal 
impact on school districts and states. But research, and even non-empirical analyses, re-
garding ESA policies has been very limited. In fact, the majority of currently available ESA 
literature has been provided by conservative think tanks, whose explicit goal is to advance 
free-market school choice reform. It is this think-tank advocacy that has driven the adoption 
and expansion of ESAs thus far.
While research and evaluation efforts should be stepped up, such efforts will face consider-
able obstacles. ESA programs embrace privatization and non-transparency by design. Ac-
countability systems are absent, and data are limited; the lack of data and reporting will 
impede research on how these policies affect students, schools, and states.
The best evidence available about the efficacy of state-subsidized private education is prob-
ably the research on conventional voucher programs. Overall, this voucher literature raises 
serious questions about the quality of the private-school education, with the most recent 
research suggesting that students using vouchers do worse than they would have done had 
they remained in their public schools. Voucher research also points to problems with ac-
countability, access, and segregation.
When considering ESAs, policymakers from all perspectives must carefully weigh the evi-
dence on their impact on key elements of U.S. education. Questions they should ask include:
•	 Will the program increase or decrease democratic participation and equality?
•	 Will the program increase or decrease segregation by race, income, disability, or 
otherwise affect specific groups of students?
•	 Will the rights of children with special needs be protected?
•	 Will the outcome entangle church and state as a policy matter, even beyond legal 
concerns?
•	 Will the program result in the state funding two parallel systems, raising effi-
ciency concerns? Will those systems be separate and unequal, sparking new legal 
challenges?
•	 How will accountability be ensured? How will malfeasance be monitored and 
controlled? 
In light of the nearly complete lack of information on what effects existing ESA programs are 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/ESAs 4 of 23
having, it is recommended that: 
•	 Policymakers should be wary of adopting or expanding an ESA program in light 
of the lack of any empirical evidence to support them and in light of their poten-
tial adverse effects.
•	 Legislatures in states with existing ESA programs should mandate and fund com-
prehensive program evaluation systems to determine their programs’ impact on 
students, families, schools, districts and states.
•	 Legislatures designing new programs should routinely include mandated and 
funded comprehensive evaluation systems.
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Ever since the introduction of the first modern school voucher programs in Milwaukee (1990) 
and Cleveland (1995), public subsidies of private school tuition have expanded and diver-
sified. According to the National Conference of State Legislators, 15 states (including the 
District of Columbia) have adopted conventional voucher policies.1 But a total of 30 states 
have adopted voucher-like policies, in one form or another.2 The newest approach is called 
Education Savings Accounts (ESAs)—also called, in Arizona— “Empowerment Scholarship 
Accounts.” Parents willing to eschew public school enrollment are provided a set sum, of-
ten in the form of a debit account, which they can use to purchase a variety of educational 
services in the private marketplace. Voucher advocates trumpet these policies as “The New 
Frontier in School Choice.”3 As Adam Peshek and Gerard Robinson explain:
[F]or more than two decades, school choice had been just that—school choice. 
In a potentially profound development, ESAs focus on educational choice and 
upend many assumptions that have framed education policy issues. Instead 
of limiting parents’ educational choices to schools, ESAs give families almost 
unfettered control over the public funds allocated for their child’s education. 
With an ESA, parents are able to customize their child’s education by com-
bining traditional schools, homeschooling, and different education providers, 
including tutors, therapists, online and blended models. The ability to direct 
education funds to the schools and services of parents’ choice gives them an 
unpresented amount of discretion over their child’s education.4
The unifying theme of private-school voucher policies is that they leverage public funding 
to subsidize the payment of private school tuition.5 Another consistency across voucher pol-
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icies is that the primary end-recipients of voucher funding are religious schools.6 ESAs fall 
comfortably within these voucher rules, but—as Peshek and Robinson enthusiastically point 
out—they also are unique for the level of parental discretion in how the public funding will 
ultimately be spent. 
Most of the growth in voucher policies occurred after the U.S. Supreme Court cleared the way 
in 2002, largely removing the federal Establishment Clause as a legal obstacle.7 However, as 
the Arizona Supreme Court showed in a 2009 decision called Cain v. Horne, a conventional 
voucher policy can still violate provisions in state constitutions.8 Key to this ruling was the 
fact that these conventional voucher policies involve an appropriation of state money that is 
ultimately cashed in by the religious school.
What potentially separates ESAs from conventional vouchers in this regard is that they are 
designed as a work-around of such state constitutional prohibitions against using public 
funds to support religious activities. Instead of providing public money directly to religious 
schools, ESA programs allocate funds to parents, who are then free to use the funds for 
tuition or fees in a religious or non-religious private school or to pay for such educational 
services as private tutoring, online programs, and extracurricular activities. While program 
eligibility requirements, the amount of public funds provided, and other features vary across 
states (see Table I), one uniformity is that students taking advantage of an ESA program may 
not concurrently enroll in a public school.9 
Table I 
Education Savings Accounts
Sources: Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013); Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886 (Nev. 
2016); Faasse v. Scott (Florida 2nd Judicial Circuit, 2014); https://www.edchoice.org; https://www.azcentral.
com/story/news/local/arizona-education/2017/06/22/oversight-arizona-esa-school-voucher-program-almost-
sham/407961001/





2011 Court of appeals 
found no violation of 
the state constitution 
(1) Special Ed, (2) Attend a “D” or “F” 
letter-grade school or school district, (3) 
Been adopted from the state’s foster 
care system, (4) Child lives on a Native 
American reservation. (Referendum in 
Nov. 2018 will likely decide if scaled up.) 
4,525 
(2017-18) 
100% of base funding for students earning up to 
250% of poverty; 90% of base funding for all 
others. 
None 
Florida Gardiner 2014 Dismissed because 
plaintiffs lacked legal 
standing 
Special Education 7,463 (2016) The General Appropriations Act specifies the 
annual amount. The amount varies according to 
grade, county of residence, and public school 
spending for students with disabilities. The Florida 
legislature appropriated $107.4 million to the ESA 
program for 2017–18. 
Recipient 
students must 




Mississsippi EEO Special 
Needs 
2015 none Special Education 425 (2016-17) The annual award amount is $6,637, subject to 
increase or decrease by the same proportion as 
the Mississippi Adequate Education Program base 
student cost. 
Norm ref test; 
audit 
North Carolina Personal ESA 2017 none Special Education Will begin in 
2018-19 
The maximum value for an ESA is $9,000 per 
student per year.  $3.4 million was appropriated to 
the state’s ESAs for the 2018–19 school year. 
None 
Nevada ESA 2015 ESA did not violate 
“no aid” provision, but 





100% of base funding for students with special 
needs or those that live in families with incomes 
up to 100 percent of the free and reduced-price 
lunch program; 90% of base funding for all others. 
Norm ref test 
Tennessee Individualized 
EAP 
2015 none Special Education 87 (2017-18) 100% of base IEA funding. Norm ref test 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/ESAs 7 of 23
The most vocal advocates of ESAs include conservative and libertarian organizations such as 
the Cato Institute, the American Federation for Children, the American Legislative Exchange 
Council, and EdChoice (formerly the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice). Such 
advocates contend that ESA programs provide parents with increased choice, flexibility, and 
the freedom to design innovative educational experiences for their children, especially when 
a public school is seen as not meeting a child’s needs.10 Critics of ESA programs include 
organizations such as school board associations, teacher unions, the ACLU, and Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State. Such critics contend that ESAs run counter to 
the purposes of education in a democracy, are not educationally accountable, are susceptible 
to fraud and improper practices, and divert limited public funding away from local public 
schools into private schools.11 They also point to research (discussed below) suggesting that 
voucher programs are not associated with positive test score effects.12 Finally, notwithstand-
ing a recent track record of generally unsuccessful litigation against voucher laws, critics ar-
gue that ESAs are unconstitutional because they run counter to state and federal principles 
of separation of church and state.13
ESA Legislative Developments 
As of December 2017, a total of six states have passed ESA legislation. The first program was 
adopted in Arizona in 2011. Florida followed in 2014, and then three states—Mississippi, 
Tennessee, and Nevada—passed legislation in 2015. The newest ESA program was adopted 
by North Carolina in 2017.14
Efforts to expand ESAs continue.15 In addition to North Carolina, 13 states introduced leg-
islation proposing ESA programs within the past two years (2016 and 2017): Arkansas, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Virginia and Texas.16
States that have passed ESA legislation have adopted one of two approaches:  targeted or 
universal. The targeted approach limits eligibility to a specific group of students, generally 
students with disabilities. Of the six existing ESA states, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
and North Carolina all adopted a targeted model.17 In contrast, the universal model allows 
all school-aged students to enroll in an ESA program. Nevada adopted a universal model, al-
though the Nevada program has not yet been implemented due to a court decision prohibit-
ing the legislature from funding ESAs with monies allocated for public schools. The Nevada 
legislature must create an alternative funding stream before implementation, which has not 
happened because in 2016 Nevada Democrats successfully flipped control of both chambers 
in the state legislature.
Arizona initially adopted a targeted model, but the legislature in 2017 expanded the model 
to create a universal ESA program by 2020, although enrollment is initially capped at about 
30,000. This “foot in the door” expansion approach is common with voucher legislation, 
which tends to start off with enrollment caps and with benefits directed toward a sympathet-
ic subgroup of students. Florida, for example, incrementally increased eligibility for its ESA 
program, which now includes more types of disabilities than when initially adopted. Arizo-
na, prior to this most recent expansion, increased its original eligibility criteria in 2013 and 
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2014 to include students in failing schools, low-income students, and Native American stu-
dents living on a reservation. The 2017 expansion into a universal program, however, faced 
immediate and significant public resistance. The Save Our Schools grassroots campaign has 
apparently collected enough signatures to put the issue on the November 2018 ballot.18 In 
turn, expansion proponents have filed suit to have the petition and its signatures invalidated 
(see below discussion of this litigation).19
Litigation
State constitutions, as noted above, can pose a legal impediment for voucher laws. Different 
states have different provisions, ranging from the type of “no aid” clause that was applied in 
striking down the Arizona voucher law mentioned earlier,20 to “compelled support” provi-
sions that exist in 29 state constitutions, to so-called Blaine amendment language that exists 
in 36 state constitutions.21 In addition, state constitutions sometimes include provisions 
concerning local control of schooling22 or language specifying the type of schooling system to 
exist in the state,23 either of which can limit voucher legality. Provisions specifying sources 
of funding, such as the one at issue in the Nevada case mentioned above and discussed be-
low, can also come into play.24
Federal Courts
The 2002 Zelman decision largely ended federal challenges to voucher laws. In a nutshell, 
the U.S. Supreme Court found that Cleveland’s conventional voucher policy did not run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause, because the policy allowed parents to make genuine, in-
dependent choices among a variety of options, only some of which were religious schools.25 
Because of this decision, plaintiffs in subsequent litigation have primarily focused on state 
constitutions.
But federal courts may still become important. Over the past half-century, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has shifted from first striking down voucher-like laws,26 to then allowing them,27 to 
now signaling that they may be constitutionally favored. In 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Trinity Lutheran v. Comer found that Missouri’s policy of denying playground-re-
surfacing grants to religious institutions violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
Clause because it discriminated against organizations based on their religious character.28 
While this decision was limited to funding for a secular purpose, not for religious teaching, 
the Court may extend the Trinity Lutheran reasoning in a later case—essentially finding 
state constitutional provisions to be discriminatory if they prohibit funding for private/re-
ligious school vouchers.
State Courts
ESA programs have been challenged on state constitutional grounds in three states: Arizona 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/ESAs 9 of 23
(2011), Florida (2014) and Nevada (2015). Each of these is discussed below.
Arizona
The first ESA lawsuit, Niehaus v. Huppenthal, was filed in Arizona in 2011 by Sharon Nie-
haus, a parent of a student with disabilities.29 The plaintiff argued that ESA programs violat-
ed Article 9, Section 10 of the Arizona Constitution (the “no aid” clause)—just as the state’s 
supreme court had found in Cain v. Horne in 2009, regarding the state’s earlier convention-
al voucher policy. However, the Arizona court of appeals decided in 2013 that the state’s ESA 
program was meaningfully different and therefore constitutional. The key distinction, the 
court reasoned, was that the ESA policy turns to parents to independently make decisions as 
to how ESA funds are to be used. That is, the law was found by this court to not involve any 
appropriation of public money made in aid of any religious institution.
As mentioned above, lawmakers in Arizona decided, after this court ruling, to expand the 
program—most recently, deciding in 2017 to make it universally available to families who 
eschew public schools. However, the state’s law may again change. Opponents filed signa-
tures with the state to put a referendum on the November 2018 ballot, which (if passed) 
would reverse the expansion of the ESA program. Complicating the issue, voucher propo-
nents have brought a lawsuit challenging the validity of the signatures.30
Florida
Florida’s ESA was also challenged in court, with the plaintiffs alleging that the law was en-
acted in violation of Florida’s constitution’s “single subject matter” rule, which allows only 
one subject to be addressed in a single piece of legislation. However, the trial court never 
addressed the merits of the claim, instead dismissing the case because the plaintiff did not 
have “standing.”31 A plaintiff in any lawsuit must show a special injury, beyond what any 
other resident of the state might suffer, in order to have legal standing to proceed.
Nevada
The most recent, and arguably the most consequential, ESA lawsuits were both filed in Ne-
vada in 2015. The ACLU filed the first, Duncan v. Nevada, on behalf of five citizens and 
Americans United for Separation of Church and State. The plaintiffs argued that the law vio-
lates Nevada’s constitution for three reasons: (a) allowing funding to potentially be used for 
a “sectarian purpose;” (b) creating a “competing system of private schools whose curricular, 
instruction, and educational standards diverge dramatically from those of public schools;” 
and (c) allowing participating private schools to potentially discriminate based on “religion, 
sexual orientation, and gender identity.”32 
Soon after the ACLU suit, the Education Law Center of New Jersey and the organization 
Educate Nevada Now filed the second suit, Lopez v Schwartz. The plaintiffs argued that 
the program would (a) divert funds set aside for public schools to private, often religious, 
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schools; (b) reduce the funds deemed sufficient to operate Nevada public schools; and (c) 
create a system of schools that is not legislatively established and that are not free and open 
to all students.33
Ultimately, the two cases were consolidated into one, and they were heard together by the 
Nevada Supreme Court. Based on reasoning similar to that used in the Arizona Niehaus 
court, the Nevada Supreme Court found that using taxpayer money for private education 
was constitutional. The state constitution prohibited use of public funds for sectarian pur-
poses. But the court reasoned as follows:
Once the public funds are deposited into an education savings account, the 
funds are no longer “public funds” but are instead the private funds of the 
individual parent who established the account. The parent decides where to 
spend that money for the child’s education and may choose from a variety of 
participating entities, including religious and non-religious schools. Any de-
cision by the parent to use the funds in his or her account to pay tuition at a 
religious school does not involve the use of “public funds” and thus does not 
implicate [the constitutional prohibition].34
However, the Nevada court also found the funding source to be inappropriate (see argument 
“(a)” made by the Lopez plaintiffs, as set forth above).35 The court determined that since the 
legislature did not appropriate any funds for the education savings accounts, the funneling 
of money appropriated for K-12 public education to the education savings accounts is un-
constitutional. In other words, the monies appropriated for public education cannot be used 
to fund the ESA program. As noted earlier, legislative control switched from Republican to 
Democratic the same year (2016) as the opinion was handed down, so no follow-up legisla-
tion has been passed that would provide the necessary funding. The ESA law remains on the 
books, but without the funding there is no active program.
ESA Policy Issues
ESAs have not been the subject of peer-reviewed research examining, e.g., their impacts on 
students.36 This dearth of scholarly publications can be attributed to four realities: (a) the 
fact that four of the six programs have only been in existence for two years, a short period for 
conducting research; (b) the lack of requirements in the laws for program evaluations or for 
states to collect the data needed for a serious study; (c) one program (Nevada’s) having nev-
er been implemented; and (d) the private, individualized ways that recipients are allowed to 
spent the ESA money.
In light of the lack of sound research about ESAs specifically, the most useful guidance is 
provided by research on conventional voucher programs. Voucher research can tell us about 
the likely efficacy of ESAs and can illuminate relevant policy issues. 
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Effectiveness 
In relation to the potential of vouchers to enhance academic outcomes, three major studies 
with rigorous methodology and large samples were recently released:37
•	 Louisiana—“When controlling for baseline achievement, we find [voucher] users 
are 18% of a standard deviation behind in [English Language Arts] and 34% of 
a standard deviation behind on mathematics compared with their control group 
peers after attending their most preferred private school for 2 years.”38
•	 Ohio— “The students who use vouchers to attend private schools have fared worse 
academically compared to their closely matched peers attending public schools. 
The study finds negative effects that are greater in math than in English language 
arts. Such impacts also appear to persist over time, suggesting that the results 
are not driven simply by the setbacks that typically accompany any change of 
school.”39
•	 Washington, DC—“After one year, the [voucher program] had a statistically sig-
nificant negative impact on the mathematics achievement of students offered or 
using a scholarship.”40
These studies suggest that public subsidies such as ESAs, which are intended to encourage 
movement from public schools to private schools, are unlikely to result in higher test scores 
if used for that purpose. Mathematics performance, in particular, appears to decline. We 
note, however, that these studies don’t tell us whether other uses of ESAs, to pay for private 
tutoring for example, would be more effective.
Educational Accountability 
The existing ESA laws include very few accountability measures.41 For example, the laws 
contain no requirements regarding curriculum, teacher qualifications, or admission. In-
stead, parents are placed in the role of consumers who are authorized to purchase whatever 
educational programming they wish within broad parameters and with virtually no legisla-
tive restrictions to safeguard educational quality. They are also free to choose religious edu-
cation at private sectarian institutions.42 Moreover, ESA programs—and voucher programs 
more generally—typically do not contain the access and antidiscrimination protections that 
are mandated for public schools.43
Nor are ESA programs required to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of student learning. 
In some states, as shown on Table I, parents must submit data on the academic achievement 
or progress of their students through “alternate assessments,” such as an acceptable stan-
dardized test. However, the actual programs and assessments are so diverse and unsuper-
vised that no common program evaluation system is realistic.44
This situation reflects proponents’ arguments for a free-market definition of accountability. 
That is, parents can hold schools accountable by “voting with their feet”—by declining to 
work with poor-quality vendors; market forces will thereby ensure quality and eliminate 
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poor programs.45 However, many assumptions that must be in place for an efficient market 
to function in this way (such as fully informed consumers making choices grounded in qual-
ity) are simply absent.46 Also, if the parent exhausts the limited funds in the voucher (see the 
“Access” discussion below), and students cannot enroll in a public school concurrently with 
enrollment in an ESA program, then many parents will have no genuine ability to “vote with 
their feet.”
Skeptics of the free-market perspective argue that ESAs should be held accountable to tax-
payers just as public schools are, through audits, transparency and public governance.47 
While some legislators have attempted to attach accountability requirements to ESA leg-
islation, these efforts have generally been softened or rejected for voucher policies on the 
grounds that parents are in the best position to assess their child’s progress and needs.48
Misuse of Funds 
With so few restrictions on spending, it is perhaps not surprising that Arizona’s first audit 
uncovered examples of ESA funds being used to purchase big-screen televisions, snow globes 
and sock monkeys.49 Parents also failed to turn in required accounting. Given parents’ broad 
latitudes and the lack of state oversight capabilities, much more stringent monitoring seems 
in order to safeguard the proper use of public funds for this particular educational reform. 
To their credit, some pro-ESA advocacy organizations have acknowledged the problem and 
called for stricter accountability.50 Also, the laws in Florida and Mississippi do require ran-
dom or regular account audits, but it is not yet clear how these will be implemented.51
Access, Segregation and Stratification
Research on school vouchers indicates that they increase social, economic, and racial strat-
ification, which have a variety of negative impacts.52 Part of this stratification is by parental 
choice, seeking out schools that comport with religious beliefs and teachings. Part is also 
due to schools making choices, based on such beliefs and teachings as well as factors such 
as past academic and behavioral records. Each of these forms of selecting and stratification 
has its unique causes and implications.
Advocates of ESAs rarely address the issues of segregation and social stratification, in part 
because they generally believe that any social stratification that may occur results from indi-
vidual parent choices that should be respected.53 From this perspective, de facto segregation 
does not appear to be an inherent flaw in the ESA program structure. 
One other access issue is also important, since it gets to the heart of school choice advocacy. 
How much choice do these policies really give low-income families? In Arizona, a family 
would generally receive $5,600 each year per child, deposited into the ESA.54 The largest de-
posit is probably in North Carolina, for a student with more severe special needs: $9,000 per 
student per year.55 For a lower-income family with few additional resources to supplement 
this amount, choices will be limited—particularly once transportation issues are taken into 
account.56 These concerns are supported by an analysis of Nevada applicant zip codes, aggre-
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gated by school district and matched to median income, shows most students applying for 
ESAs are from more affluent families.57 Applications from households with incomes above 
$100,000 were far more likely to enroll in an ESA program than households with incomes 
below $25,000.
Moreover, interplay between socioeconomic status and disability may exist in ESA enroll-
ment patterns. Parents of more affluent children with special needs may use the ESAs to en-
roll their children in high-resourced private schools; lower-wealth parents of children with 
disabilities won’t have those options.58 Affluent parents can, and do, supplement their ESAs 
to pay for a high-quality and expensive private school that would likely be inaccessible to 
low-income families.59 Logically, this is how special-needs-targeted ESAs without so-called 
means testing (that is, without tying eligibility to proof of low income) are likely to play out: 
wealthier families able to purchase a well-resourced private school will get a new subsidy 
from the state, while lower-wealth families will largely forego the subsidy and remain in 
public schools. If these lower-wealth families do leave the public schools and take the subsi-
dy, they will generally face powerful financial impediments to securing the resources for an 
upgrade in services for their child with special needs.
The Purpose of Public Education
In the nineteenth century, Horace Mann, father of the common schools movement, said 
“Education, then, beyond all other devices of human origin, is the great equalizer of the 
conditions of men—the balance-wheel of the social machinery.”60 Through the twentieth 
century, the popular view—with all its flaws and hypocrisies—was that universal education 
would produce an equal and democratic society.61 Written into state constitutions, public 
education was intended to consolidate a stew of different languages, religious affiliations, 
ethnic groups and economic status into a working body public.
The views given voice by Peshek and Robinson in the extended quote earlier in this brief, 
and represented by ESA programs, pushes back hard against this community ideal. It en-
courages and promotes a major shift in the purpose of public education. Under a universal 
ESA model, the state’s role shifts from providing equitable public education to all students 
to funding parents who can seek out a range of alternative educational services using public 
monies.62 Instead of providing a common public good for the benefit of society, such vouch-
er programs substitute individual choices that may or may not be governed by democratic 
norms or accountable for democratic aims.
Financial Implications for Public Schools
Depending on the funding mechanism in any given state, ESA funding can create financial 
shortfalls for public schools. During the 2015-16 school year, for example, the relatively 
small Arizona program drew $20.6 million from the public schools.63 Displacing revenue 
from already-struggling public school systems may have legal implications.64 Julie Mead 
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asks, “...does a state’s funding private education subvert its constitutional obligation to pro-
vide adequately for public education, thereby converting a child’s right to an education to 
merely the right to shop for one?”65 
The projected overall fiscal impact on the public school system depends on whether the 
law includes a hold-harmless provision (compensating schools for some of the funding lost 
when a student leaves) as well as assumptions about how many students are eligible to 
participate in the program and the size of the voucher. Revenue loss could have significant 
negative consequences for students in public schools, and dividing public resources into two 
separate systems may prove financially inefficient, with both systems becoming less ade-
quate—except as a supplement for the affluent. 
Flexibility
ESA advocacy literature trumpets the greater flexibility given parents to customize educa-
tional programming to meet the needs of individual children.66 As noted above, ESAs can be 
used in a variety of ways, including financing private education, online learning opportuni-
ties, private tutoring, and educational therapies. The laws generally also allow parents to roll 
over their unused funds on a quarterly basis. A two-year analysis67 of expenditure patterns 
of 316 parents found that:
•	 85.3% of all ESA funds were spent on private school tuition;
•	 34% percent of families used funds for multiple educational options;
•	 19.6% percent paid for education therapy and services;
•	 14.8% percent used funds for private tutoring;
•	 12.3% percent financed curriculum; and
•	 2.2% percent paid for online learning options.
An earlier study also found that a significant portion of the ESA designated funds went un-
spent.68 
For parents who are well positioned to take advantage of these choices, the ESAs can un-
doubtedly provide genuine benefits. Yet this increased ESA flexibility can come with signifi-
cant tradeoffs, particularly for families with fewer resources. Keeping in mind that students 
with disabilities have been the focus of existing ESA laws, these students—when they leave 
public schools—are relinquishing procedural and substantive legal protections under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).69 Further, as noted above, the voucher 
amount by itself is unlikely to be sufficient to pay for high-cost special needs programs. 
Another concern is that not all students have the same amount of choice and flexibility due 
to exclusionary practices. For instance, privatized educational institutions may set strin-
gent admissions requirements that some students will not be able to meet because of their 
disabilities, gender or sexual identity, background, heritage, behavior, beliefs or academic 
performance.70
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Satisfaction
The pro-ESA literature reports that ESAs result in high parent satisfaction. One frequently 
cited study was an open (non-random71) poll on a Yahoo! message board. The tallies showed 
71 percent of parents reported being “very satisfied” with the accounts; nearly 20 percent 
reported being “satisfied,” and 10 percent said they were “somewhat satisfied.”72 In a sepa-
rate article, based on a telephone survey of female respondents, approximately 73 percent 
of Latino respondents were found to support a proposed ESA program, while approximately 
22 percent said they oppose such school choice programs. And among African-American 
populations, the same study suggests that there is a strong level of support for ESAs, with 
63 percent of respondents supporting the program.73 
Discussion and Recommendations
Voucher growth in the immediate future seems likely, especially in light of the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Trinity Lutheran vs. Comer decision. And ESAs will likely continue to be 
advanced by pro-voucher advocates. For many state legislators, ESAs make a strong appeal 
to anti-government and anti-regulatory instincts. Research on outcomes—intended and 
otherwise—may have lesser importance. Still, policymakers should be aware that the latest 
group of major voucher studies indicates that ESAs and other voucher approaches are du-
bious policy tools if the goal is to improve educational outcomes or integrate society. That 
being the case, policymakers should be extremely wary of adopting or expanding an ESA 
program. When considering ESAs, policymakers from all perspectives must carefully weigh 
the evidence on their impact on key elements of U.S. education. Questions they should ask 
include:
•	 Will the program increase or decrease democratic participation and equality?
•	 Will the program increase or decrease segregation by race, income, disability, or 
otherwise affect specific groups of students?
•	 Will the rights of children with special needs be protected?
•	 Will the outcome entangle church and state as a policy matter, even beyond legal 
concerns?
•	 Will the program result in the state funding two parallel systems, raising effi-
ciency concerns? Will those systems be separate and unequal, sparking new legal 
challenges?
•	 How will accountability be ensured? How will malfeasance be monitored and 
controlled? 
In light of the nearly complete lack of information on what effects existing ESA programs 
are having, it is recommended that: 
•	 Policymakers should be wary of adopting or expanding an ESA program in light 
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of the lack of any empirical evidence to support them and in light of their poten-
tial adverse effects.
•	 Legislatures in states with existing ESA programs should mandate and fund com-
prehensive program evaluation systems to determine their programs’ impact on 
students, families, schools, districts and states.
•	 Legislatures designing new programs should routinely include mandated and 
funded comprehensive evaluation systems.
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